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DATE-OF-SALE STATUTES OF LIMITATION: AN
EFFECTIVE MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING
CHANGE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW?
In theface of a growing inability of manufacturers to procure products liability
insurance at less than exorbitant rates, several states have passed date-of-sale stat-
utes of limitation which specify that, upon expiration of a designated time period
measuredfrom the date of originalpurchase, an injuredparty can no longer bring a
products liability suit. Within the context of available choice of laws analyser, this
Note traces the limited impact of the date-of-sale statutes in a multistate products
liabiity suit. The Note also anticpates the due process and equal protection chal-
lenges that may be raisedbypotentialplaintffis barredfrom recovery by virtue of this
historicallyprocedural device. The Note concludes that even assuming the date-of-
sale statutes can withstand constitutional challenges, to the extent that their use in a
multistate suit can be avoided through selection ofa choice oflaws approach, the new
statutes can hardly be expected to stay the soaring costs ofproducts liability insur-
ance.
INTRODUCTION
IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, products liability suits have become
rather common events,' accompanied by a rise both in the size
and frequency of damage awards.2 Consequently, the cost of
products liability insurance, which is the primary means of indem-
nifying defendant manufacturers in products liability actions, has
soared.
1. The number of products liability suits being filed in district courts, for example,
grew from 1,579 in 1974 to 3,696 in 1976--an increase of 134%. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT, 11-44 (1977) [herein-
after cited as FINAL REPORT]. Connecticut, the only state to record docket lists of products
liability cases, reported a 58% increase in the number of such cases brought between 1974
and 1976. Id. at 11-45.
The advertising media, consumer research organizations such as the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, testing laboratories, and doctors are helping to educate the public with
respect to its legal rights in the field of products liability. Id. at 1-29. The response has
been enthusiastic: that public "which has been persuaded to buy with enthusiasm is just as
eager to impose liability if the product does cause harm." I L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1-5 (1978).
2. In a sample survey of state products liability suits, the Interagency Task Force
found a trend toward recovery of greater monetary damages by injured parties. While the
average damage award in the period 1965-70 was $104,202, the average award in the
1971-76 period increased to $221,514. FINAL REPORT, supra note I, at 11-56.
3. Manufacturers view the increase in insurance costs as the result of more frequent
litigation and higher plaintiff awards, which in turn are due to the judicial tendency to
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The manufacturing industry has been waging a vigorous cam-
paign to convince state governments, the public, and the legal
community that its inability to obtain insurance at reasonable
rates has reached crisis proportions.4 Consumers have alleged,
however, that business, in close alliance with its insurers, is creat-
ing a panic situation5 based on unsupported assertions that prod-
ucts liability insurance has become either unaffordable or totally
unavailable.'
favor compensation, especially in doubtful cases. Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform
of Products Liabiliy Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REv. 663 (1978).
4. As far back as 1971, G.L. Maatman, president of the National Loss Control Serv-
ice Corp., in an address to the Second Annual Conference on Product Liability Prevention,
commented:
The products liability insurance crunch has yet to reach its peak. More and more
manufacturers are going to find it increasingly difficult to obtain primary insur-
ance coverage at any price .... The solution may very well be ultimately de-
pendent on the willingness of legislative and judicial branches of government to
grant legal relief to manufacturers and sellers of products.
Is "No-Fault" Products Liability Coming?, IRON AGE, September 9, 1971, at 29. Thus, the
manufacturers argue that in view of the crippling costs of insurance needed to compensate
plaintiffs, the law of products liability should be reformulated. The objective of their resul-
tant lobbying has been the passage of new statutes of limitation for products liability ac-
tions. See, e.g., BUSINESS WEEK, January 17, 1977, at 62; FORBES, June 15, 1976, at 52
(advertisement); NATION'S BUSINESS, June, 1977, at 24.
5. Insurance companies explain this "panic situation" by asserting that products lia-
bility insurance rates were too low from 1971 to 1974. With stock market declines in
1973-74, the industry sustained heavy losses, which reduced its policyholder surplus and
thereby diminished its underwriting capacity. The substantial increase in products liability
insurance premiums which followed was a direct response to these losses. FINAL REPORT,
supra note I, at 1-23.
6. The consumers' position was summarized by Ralph Nader in his testimony before
the Senate Select Committee on Small Business on December 8, 1976. Responding to in-
surers' claims of a financial crisis, Nader asserted:
The usual techniques of the insurance industry, when it wishes to stampede the
policymakers into precipitious decision, is to dramatically hike the premiums for
a number of clients, who then in turn rush to their legislators with their real griev-
ances. . . . The cost of insurance is not in itself a reason to limit consumer rights
in the courts, but when this so-called insurance financial crisis is not even docu-
mented, one can be even more skeptical of what the industry is asking for.
Product Liabiliy Problems Affecting Small Business: Hearings Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Small Business, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1584-85, 1591 (1976) (statement of Ralph
Nader).
The issue of whether a problem of crisis proportions actually exists in products liability
remains unanswered. However, the Interagency Task Force Report on Products Liability,
the most comprehensive analysis on the topic to date, provides some insight into the cur-
rent status of the alleged products liability cases. In its 1977 Final Report, the Task Force
reported that the dearth of data both on products liability insurance and the insurance
industry precluded any finding of a crisis with respect to manufacturers' inability to
purchase products liability policies. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at XXXV. The Task
Force did, however, discover substantial increases in the cost of products liability insurance
to manufacturers since 1974. Id. at XXXVI. Nevertheless, neither the increased premiums
nor the proliferation of products liability litigation could be characterized as a problem of
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Although the exact cause of rising products liability insurance
rates remains an enigma, the costs associated with insurance cov-
erage and products liability litigation have risen substantially in
recent years.7 Therefore, it is not surprising that the manufactur-
ing industry has been taking steps to remedy the problem of prod-
ucts liability insurance costs. The most visible result of the
manufacturers' lobbying efforts has been the enactment by a
number of states of statutes of limitation pertaining specifically to
products liability actions.' The newly enacted statutes of limita-
crisis proportions within the insurance industry, despite that industry's claimed inability to
meet the costs and risks of providing comprehensive products liability insurance to all
manufacturers. Id. at XXXVII.
7. Id. at 11-44, 11-56.
8. Since 1977, 18 states have considered legislative reforms in products liability, with
respect to new statutes of limitation. Bivins, The Products Liability Crisis: Modest Propos-
alsfor Legislative Reform, 11 AKRON L. REv. 595, 611 (1978); Comment, Statutes of Repose
in Products Liability The Assault Upon the Citadel ofStrict Liability, 23 S.D.L. REV. 149
(1978).
The following jurisdictions have enacted date-of-sale statutes of limitation:
(I) Colorado:
IT]en years after a product is first sold for use or consumption, it shall be rebut-
tably presumed that the product was not defective and that the manufacturer or
seller thereof was not negligent and that all warnings and instructions were
proper and adequate.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (1977).
(2) Connecticut:
No action to recover damages for injury to the person or to real or personal prop-
erty caused by any product in a defective condition shall be brought against one
who manufactures [or] sells ... any such product but within three years from the
date when the injury is first sustained, discovered or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have been discovered except that no such action may be brought later
than eight years from the date-of-sale,. . . of such product.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West Supp. 1978).
(3) Florida:
Actions for products liability.., must be begun within the period prescribed in
this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the
cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered. . . but in any
event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its
original purchaser ....
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West Supp. 1978).
(4) Indiana:
[A]ny product liability action must be commenced within two (2) years after the
cause of action accrues or within ten (10) years after the delivery of the product to
the initial user or consumer ....
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (Burns 1978).
(5) Kentucky
In any product liability action, it shall be presumed, until rebutted by a prepon-
derance of the evidence to the contrary, that the subject product was not defective
if the injury, death or property damage occurred either more than five (5) years
after the date of sale to the first consumer or more than eight (8) years after the
date of manufacture.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Baldwin 1978).
(6) Nebraska:
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tion begin to run upon delivery of a product to its original pur-
chaser.' Upon expiration of the statutory time period, measured
from the date of original purchase, a products liability action can
no longer be maintained by an injured party.10
Manufacturers contend that by designating a specific time pe-
riod during which suit must be brought, date-of-sale statutes of
limitation provide them, at last, with a reasonable standard for
predicting their potential liability, especially with respect to older
(1) All product liability actions shall be commenced within four years next after
the date on which the death, injury, or damage complained of occurs. (2)
Notwithstanding subsection (I). . . any product liability action, except one gov-
erned by section 2-725, Uniform Commercial Code, shall be commenced within
ten years after the date when the product which allegedly caused the personal
injury, death, or damage was first sold or leased for use or consumption.
Naa. REV. STAT. § 25-224(l)-(2) (1978).
(7) Oregon:
[A] product liability civil action shall be commenced not later than eight years
after the date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption.
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (1977).
(8) Tennessee:
Tennessee law provides that products actions be brought within either ten years from
date of first sale or within one year after expiration of anticipated life of the product,
whichever is shorter. Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch.
703.
(9) Utah:
"No action shall be brought for the recovery of damages for personal injury,
death or damage to property more than six years after the date of initial purchase
for use or consumption, or ten years after the date of manufacture, of a product
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977).
9. The statutes of limitation traditionally employed in tort actions do not begin run-
ning until the injury itself is sustained. Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limita-
tions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1178, 1185 (1949).
10. Among the date-of-sale statutes of limitation enacted by nine jurisdictions, several
distinctions are noteworthy. First, the time period during which an action may be brought
ranges from five to twelve years after the initial sale of the product. See note 8 supra.
Second, the statutes are structured differently. Several states have formulated limits based
on the date of manufacture. E.g., Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977). Other states
have imposed limits which reflect the anticipated life of the particular product. Eg., Ten-
nessee, Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 703. A number
of jurisdictions have chosen to supplement their traditional date-of-injury limitations by
tacking on a date-of-sale limitation as an additional restriction upon the ability to maintain
a products liability action. E.g., Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West
Supp. 1978); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West Supp. 1978); Indiana, IND. CODE
ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (West Supp. 1978); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-224(l)-(2) (1978).
Still other states have formulated their date-of-sale statutes of limitation in the form of
rebuttable presumptions. Under these statutes, upon expiration of a statutory period com-
mencing with the date of sale, a product is presumed to be nondefective; to maintain a
products liability action a plaintiff must rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the
evidence. E.g., Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (1977); Kentucky, KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 411.3 10 (Baldwin 1978).
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products." t Conversely, consumer groups view the manufacturers'
campaign to secure date-of-sale limitations as nothing short of a
"corporate assault. . a major, fundamental, determined drive to
codify in a strangulatory manner the frontiers of common law in
products liability."' l
Irrespective of the impetus behind their passage, date-of-sale
statutes represent a rethinking of the policy considerations which
underlie the strict liability principles presently applied in products
liability cases. Under the strict liability approach to product-
related injuries, the economic burden is placed upon the manufac-
turers under the theory that it will be treated "as a cost of produc-
tion against which liability insurance can be obtained."' 3 It is no
longer clear, however, that manufacturers are able to obtain insur-
ance at rates which can be internalized as a cost of production and
still remain competitive." Under the date-of-sale concept, manu-
facturers continue to absorb the cost of insuring against the risk of
product-related injuries but the duration of such risk is expressly
limited to the statutory period. The manufacturers hope that this
reduction in risk will lead to a commensurate reduction in the cost
of insurance, which they can effectively pass on to consumers as a
cost of production.' 5
Because date-of-sale statutes represent a radical change in
products liability law, they are likely to be a source of lively con-
troversy between disgruntled consumers and relieved manufactur-
ers. With a number of these new statutes taking effect in the past
year,16 conflicts arising from their application to products liability
actions are bound to move into the courts for ultimate resolution.
The broad purpose of this Note is to assess the viability of the
11. Proponents of date-of-sale limitations argue that this mechanism "would merely
restore a balance of benefits and burdens in the marketplace, that there have been an inor-
dinate number of suits involving older products, and that manufacturers should no longer
be required to bear an unreasonable share of the risk involved in the use of their products."
Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes ofLimitations-4 New Immunityfor Product Suppliers, 1977
INS. L.J. 535, 542 (1977).
12. Nader, The Corporate Assault on Products Liability. A Call To Aetion, TRIAL, Oc-
tober, 1977, at 38. Nader characterizes the attack on products liability as an attempt by
insurers to save money, a dislike for the decentralized decisionmaking of the courts, and a
concern on the part of insurers that heretofore secret information will be made public. Id.
at 39.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1962).
14. Comment, supra note 8, at 165.
15. FINAL REPORT, supra note I, at XXXVI.
16. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 95.031(2) (West Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (West Supp. 1978).
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date-of-sale statutes of limitation and their ability to withstand
impending judicial scrutiny. First, this Note investigates the use-
fulness of the date-of-sale limitations in the multistate products
liability suit. 7 With increasing nationwide distribution and re-
gional manufacture of products, the involvement of more than
one jurisdiction in a single products liability action has become
common. The multistate context raises important conflicts of law
considerations which this Note addresses.
Second, this Note assesses the ability of the date-of-sale stat-
utes to withstand scrutiny under the federal and state constitu-
tions.' 8 Due process and equal protection challenges are likely in
view of the durational limit which the date-of-sale concept im-
poses on the consumers' ability to maintain a products liability
action. '9
The Note concludes that even assuming that the date-of-sale
statutes are able to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the lack of
uniformity with respect to their use in a multistate products liabil-
ity suit renders them devices of limited utility-not only as a
means to protect the manufacturers of a product but also as a
means to stay the soaring costs of products liability insurance.2 °
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTES OF LIMITATION IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
A. Early Attempts to Identify the Proper Cause of Action: Tort
or Contract?
The law of products liability, which presently imposes strict
liability upon the manufacturer of a defective product,2' evolved
17. See notes 60-111 infra and accompanying text. For a comprehensive discussion
of the conflicts of laws issue, see Phillips, An Anaiysir of Proposed Reform of Products Lia-
bility Statutes of Limitation, 56 N.C.L. REV. 663, 672 (1978) and Note, State Legislative
Restrictions on Product Liability Actions, 29 MERCER L. REV. 619, 634 (1978).
18. See notes 112-41 infra and accompanying text.
19. For additional discussions of possible constitutional obstacles, see Massery, supra
note 11, at 545-49; Phillips, supra note 17, at 673; Student Symposium, Products Liability:
1978 Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law, 12 IND. L. REv. 227, 25 1-53 (1978);
Comment, supra note 8, at 174-76.
20. See notes 142-52 infra and accompanying text.
21. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 27, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963). See generally Carmichael, Strict Liability in Tort-An Explosion in Prod-
ucts Liability Law, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 528 (1971); Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The
Drpif To ward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963 (1957); Plant, Strict Liability of Manu-
facturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products: An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV.
938 (1957); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel" Strict Liability to the Consumer, 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791 (1966); Traynor, The Ways and Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
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from two causes of action, one sounding in negligence22 and the
other based on breach of an implied warranty.23 Until 1963,24 the
major controversy with respect to statutes of limitation centered
upon whether, in products-related suits, a tort or contract statute
should apply. This question was resolved according to the injured
plaintiff's theory of recovery. For instance, in suits brought under
a negligence theory of recovery, the prevailing view was that a tort
type of limitation should control. Thus, the statute of limitation
would begin to run on the date of the personal injury or property
damage.2 5
Tort statutes of limitation were applied with relative ease in
suits brought on a theory of negligence. By contrast, courts appar-
ently were in a state of flux about what kind of statute of limita-
tion should prevail in suits premised on a breach of warranty
theory.26 One reason suggested for the uncertainty over the use of
the warranty theory was the hybrid character of the remedy;27 es-
sentially, the remedy originated in tort but was developed as an
action in contract. In such cases, some courts took the position
that a breach of warranty action originated in the manufacturer's
32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
22. Under this approach, liability attached to anyone who manufactured or sold any
product reasonably capable of inflicting substantial harm if defectively made. Eg., Smith
v. S.S. Kresge Co., 79 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1935); Simmons Co. v. Hardin, 75 Ga. App. 420,
43 S.E.2d 553 (1947).
23. Traditionally, a cause of action brought for breach of an implied warranty re-
quired the presence of privity of contract between seller and purchaser. See, e.g., Huset v.
J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903), which followed the rule that a
contractor or manufacturer shall not be held liable to third parties with whom it does not
have a contractual relation for negligence in the construction, manufacture, or handling of
his products. The court expressed the policy behind the privity requirement as follows:
[T]here must be a fixed and definite limitation to the liability of manufacturers
and vendors for negligence in the construction and sale of complicated machines
and structures which are to be operated or used by the intelligent and the ignorant
that cannot be known to the manufacturers or vendors, and who use the articles
all over the country hundreds of miles distant from the place of their manufacture
or original sale. ...
Id. at 867.
24. In 1963, one court expressly recognized that responsibility for defective products
was to be governed not by contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Co., 59 Cal. 2d 27, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rpt. 697 (1963). Other
courts eventually adopted the approach. See notes 34-38, 60-61, and 73 infra and accom-
panying text.
25. See generally, Comment, Choice of Law: Statutes ofLimitations in the Multi-State
Products Liability Case, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1130 (1974); Note, Statutes of Limitation: Their
Selection andApplication in Products Liability Cases, 23 VAND. L. REV. 775 (1970).
26. Note, supra note 25, at 782.
27. Id.
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breach of contract, thus requiring that a contract limitation, run-
ning from the date of sale of the injurious product, be used.28
Other courts chose to emphasize the nature of the plaintiff's injury
and applied a tort statute of limitation.29
The early controversy over the use of tort or contract statutes
of limitation was indicative of two competing policy considera-
tions in the products liability setting. The use of a contract limita-
tion, running from the date of a product's sale, set an explicit time
limit upon an injured party's ability to sustain a products liability
claim. As such, it functioned as a device to eliminate stale claims.
In contrast, the use of a tort statute, which would not begin to run
until an injury was sustained, reflected less of an attitude toward
protecting potential defendants from possible stale claims and
more of an effort to preserve the injured plaintiff's right of redress,
regardless of how long after manufacture the injury occurred.
The dispute over the proper statute of limitation for products
liability claims thus reflected an inability to solve the more basic
issue of substantive liability-whether a products liability cause of
action should be viewed as an action in tort, for which the right to
compensation should be stressed, or as an action for breach of
contract, for which specific rights and liabilities should be deline-
ated.3o
B. Strict Liability: A Solution to the Tort Versus Contract
Dispute over Statutes of Limitation
The creation of the strict liability in tort doctrine in 1963 was
perceived as the solution to the prior controversy over statutes of
limitation. With the adoption of a single products liability cause
of action in all jurisdictions, it was assumed that "the confusion in
28. Id See, e.g., Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d
207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969), in which a six-year statute of limitation for contract actions
was held to govern an action arising from an injury caused by the alleged faulty installa-
tion of a glass door. According to the court, the theory of recovery was based upon a
breach of an implied warranty made by the defendant manufacturer that the goods were fit
for their designed purpose. This theory of recovery justified application of a contract-type
limitation commencing at the time of sale. Id. at 308, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S. 2d at
495.
29. See, e.g., Chavez v. Kitsch, 70 N.M. 439, 374 P.2d 497 (1962), in which a personal
injury statute of limitation was applied in an action for breach of express or implied war-
ranty against a manufacturer of heating equipment. The court reasoned as follows:
"When an action in its effect is one for the recovery of damages for personal injury, the
statute of limitation for injuries to the person applies, even though the cause of action
stated is ex conlractu in its nature." Id. at 444, 374 P.2d at 500.
30. Note, supra note 25, at 791.
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selecting and applying statutes of limitations in products liability
cases [would] be largely eliminated. ' 31 Under the strict liability
theory, the use of contract law statutes of limitation was to be
abandoned; existing tort statutes of limitation applied in personal
injury and property damage actions were to prevail in all products
liability cases. 32 Furthermore, the strict tort doctrine provided, for
the first time, some definite indication of the appropriate policies
for the future development of products liability law. As stated in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
[T]he justification for the strict liability has been said to be
that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consump-
tion, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility to-
ward any member of the consuming public who may be injured
by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the
case of a product which it needs and for which it is forced to
rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind
their goods; that the public policy demands that the burden of
accidental injuries caused by products intended for consump-
tion be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a
cost of production against which liability insurance can be ob-
tained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the
maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the
proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.
33
Despite the tremendous potential of the strict tort concept for
resolving the dispute over the proper statute of limitation and end-
ing the underlying policy struggles, the doctrine was not readily
accepted in all jurisdictions. As of 1970, only about one-half of
the states were applying strict liability to injuries caused by all
types of products.34 The rest of the states, with the exception of
Idaho and Louisiana, had indicated only partial support for the
doctrine by adopting a variety of statutes which abrogated the
privity requirement in certain products liability suits.
35
Because of the failure of the strict liability doctrine to be uni-
versally adopted, the statute of limitation dilemma continued into
the early 1970's. Some jurisdictions applied strict tort liability to
31. Id. at 788.
32. Dean Prosser emphasized that strict liability in tort is a theory of recovery unto
itself, finding "no need to borrow a concept from the contract law of sales .... Why talk
of it? If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability in tort, declared
outright, without any illusory contract mask." Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1962).
34. W. SCHWARTZ, A PRODUCTS LIABILrrY PRIMER 5 (1970).
35. Id. Under the privity requirement, recovery is limited to the product's original
purchaser. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 641 (4th ed. 1971).
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all product-related cases, 36 others applied it only in certain situa-
tions,37 and still others continued to rely on familiar contract prin-
ciples in adjudicating such claims.38 The problem intensified with
increasing nationwide manufacture and distribution of products.
The national character of industrial production meant that a
number of different states could become involved in a single prod-
ucts liability suit when the situs of manufacture, distribution, sale,
and injury were different.39 The multistate products suit, with dis-
parate statutes of limitation potentially available, created serious
choice of law issues"u which have influenced the development of
products liability law in the 1970's.
C. Multistate Products Liability Actions." The Continuing Statute
of Limitation Dilemma
The plethora of multistate products liability actions which
arose in the early 1970's 4 again and again raised the question
whether-in the context of a choice of law problem-a tort or
contract statute of limitation was applicable in such actions. For
example, a multistate suit might involve both a jurisdiction which
had accepted strict liability in tort and a jurisdiction which ap-
plied a breach of warranty theory to cases involving defective
products. This presented the problem of selecting the appropriate
statute of limitation.42 Conducting the necessary choice of laws
analysis, courts were faced with the additional task of deciding
which factors-place of injury, of manufacture, of sale, or of dis-
covery of the defect--connecting the cause of action to a particu-
lar state, were to be decisive of the statute of limitation issue.43 It
has even been suggested that the choice of laws dilemma is inca-
pable of resolution; neither traditional nor modem choice of law
36. As of mid-1973, these jurisdictions were: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecti-
cut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and
Wisconsin. I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4.41 (2d
ed. 1974).
37. Id. Those states restricting the application of strict liability included Arkansas,
Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
38. Id. Strict liability in tort was rejected in Delaware, Florida, Georgia, and North
Dakota.
39. Comment, supra note 25, at 1142.
40. For a comprehensive analysis of the choice of law issue, see id.
41. See note 1 supra.
42. Comment, supra note 25, at 1142.
43. Id.
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techniques yield a predictable means of determining which state's
statute of limitation should govern in a given suit."
Under a traditional conflict of laws analysis, the question of
which jurisdiction's substantive law is to apply is resolved accord-
ing to the conflicts rule of the forum state, the lexfori.45 The con-
flicts statutes of most states call for application of the substantive
law of the state where the action arose-the lex loci delicti-in
products cases, the law of tort or contract.46 The problem is com-
plicated by the traditional characterization of a statute of limita-
tion as a procedural matter,47 thus governed according to the
dictates of the lexfori. Therefore, in resolving the issues before it,
a court is confronted with the contradiction between the substan-
tive rule of law from one jurisdiction and the procedural rule of
another jurisdiction,4 with the additional complication that, in a
products liability context, inconsistent results may occur.
For example, if a products liability suit were brought in State
A, which has a tort statute of limitation, the tort limitation would
be used. If in the same suit, however, the substantive law of State
B, the state in which the cause of action arose, were to apply, and
State B adhered to a warranty cause of action for products liabil-
ity claims, State A's tort limitation period could conceivably be
measured from the date-of-sale of the injurious product,49 rather
than from the date of injury. The result of this interplay of tradi-
tional choice of law rules is a hybrid statute of limitation without
allegiance to either tort or contract principles.5 0
The modern approaches to conflict of laws analysis, which are
not restricted to the use of the standard lexfori and lex loci delicti
44. Id.
45. Note, supra note 9, at 1260.
This forum rule rests on the theory that general statutes of limitation, operating
only to limit the time within which an action may be brought rather than to extin-
guish the underlying right, are rules of procedure . . . and reflect the forum's
determination of the time after which its courts can no longer operate fairly and
effectively.
Id.
46. See, e.g., Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 467 F.2d 679 (5th Cir.
1972) (forum state from which venue was changed applies law of the state where the cause
of action arose, which provided that an action accrues at the time the defect becomes
known).
47. Note, supra note 9, at 1187.
48. Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 467 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1972).
49. Comment, supra note 25, at 1142.
50. Id. at 1147. In such a situation, "the problem of characterization may result in a
cause of action being barred before it has arisen." Id. (citing the result in Alabama Great
S.LR. Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 467 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1972)).
19791
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
rules, do not fare much better when used to determine the proper
statute of limitation to be applied in multistate products liability
actions. For example, under the "contact" approaches,5' the stat-
ute of limitation of the jurisdiction having the greatest number of
contacts with the cause of action is used. However, there may be
no one state with a greater number of contacts than the others,52 a
problem which this quantitative approach to choice of law deci-
sionmaking is unequipped to solve.
Similarly, under modem approaches which defer to a forum
state's "government interest" in a particular products liability ac-
tion,53 identifying which interest should prevail poses difficul-
ties.54 For example, the government's interest in protecting its
consumers would require application of the law of the state in
which the injury took place; however, an equally legitimate inter-
est in product safety would favor application of the law of the
state in which the injurious product was manufactured. In the
early 1970's, this conflict between competing state interests be-
came a serious obstacle to usefulness of the "government interest"
approach55 in products-related suits.
Finally, applying the "law most favorable to the plaintiff"56
was suggested as an appropriate conflict of laws analysis. Its ad-
vocates asserted that, in the products liability context, the use of
the statute of limitation most favorable to the injured party would
51. For the purposes of this Note, the "contact" approaches include the "center of
gravity test", discussed in text accompanying notes 81-83 infra, and the "significant rela-
tionship test", discussed in text accompaning note 84 infra.
52. In such a case, with an equal number of contacts allotted to each state, the choice
of law arbitrarily forces a cause of action into one jurisdiction rather than the other.
Kuihne, Choice of Law in Products Liability, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16 (1972). See also
Comment, supra note 25, at 1143.
53. According to one theorist, the "government interest" theory dictates that if a fo-
rum state's connection with a cause of action gives it a "legitimate interest" in having its
law applied, the law of the forum state generally should be applied. Currie, The Constitu-
tion and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L.
REv. 9-10 (1958). For an example of an attempt to identify the social, political, or eco-
nomic interests of a state in a particular cause of action, see Watson v. Employers Liab.
Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
54. See Comment, supra note 25, at 1144. Both product safety and consumerism un-
derlie products liability law. In this context it is difficult to identify the predominant inter-
est.
55. Id.
56. See generally D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 139 (1965); Ehrenzweig,
Products Liability in the Conflict ofLaws-Toward a Theory o/Enterprise Liability Under
'Toreseeable and Insurable Laws 11, 69 YALE L.J. 794, 800 (1960); Leflar, Choice Influ-
encing Considerations in Conflicts of Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267, 282 (1966); Leflar, Con-
flicts Law." More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584 (1966).
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harmonize with the developing trend toward consumer protection
and compensation.57 On the other hand, this explicit policy judg-
ment reveals a desire to further the legal rights of injured parties,
a course which may exceed the proper role of a neutral, procedu-
ral statute of limitation.58
In summary, the early 1970's seemed to offer few solutions to
the statutes of limitation controversy; the issue had, in fact, be-
come more clouded with the proliferation of multistate products
liability suits. As one commentator described the situation:
"Manufacturers, consumers and courts will be compelled to make
choices and decisions based on confusion rather than on orderly,
predictable, and equitable standards until strict liability in tort is
adopted, the Uniform Commercial Code is deemed appropriate,
or statutes are enacted specifying the proper limitation. '5 9
II. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY BETWEEN TORT VERSUS
DATE-OF-SALE STATUTES OF LIMITATION IN PRODUCT
LIABILITY SUITS
Since the early 1970's, the strict liability in tort doctrine has
enjoyed continuous judicial acceptance. At present, it is applied
in nearly every jurisdiction in all products liability actions.6" The
nearly uniform adoption of the doctrine has eliminated the con-
flict over whether to apply a strict tort or a contract limitation in
multistate actions since, under strict liability, a tort type of limita-
tion is universally applied.6'
Recent developments in the law have, however, introduced
new complications within the doctrine of strict liability in tort.
The passage of new date-of-sale statutes of limitation by some
nine jurisdictions raises the issue of whether date-of-sale or tort
statutes of limitation are more appropriate in the products liability
setting.62 From a practical standpoint, a tort statute would impose
57. Comment, supra note 25, at 1145.
58. Id. at 1146.
59. Note, supra note 25, at 791. See also Shanker, A Case of Judicial Chutzpah (The
Judicial Adoption of Strict Tort Products Liability Theory), 11 AKRON L. REV. 697 (1978),
which argues that the Uniform Commercial Code comprehensively covers product liability
actions.
60. For a discussion of the current status of strict liability in different jurisdictions, see
[1977] 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4070.
61. According to Dean Prosser, strict liability in tort was designed to abolish all draw-
backs associated with the warranty cause of action, including the contract statute of limita-
tion which accompanied it. W. PROSSER, supra note 35, at 658.
62. For the text of the date-of-sale statutes of limitation enacted thus far, see note 8
supra.
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strict liability on the manufacturer beginning at the date of the
products-related injury; a date-of-sale statute would impose strict
liability for any products-related injury occurring during a pre-
scribed period measured from the date of sale.63 On an even
broader scale, the enactment of date-of-sale limitations calls into
question the continuing prudence of the strict liability doctrine in
light of rising insurance and litigation costs.64
Moreover, in the multistate products liability context, the pres-
ent situation simply shifts the focus of choice of law questions: the
choice is now between tort and the new date-of-sale statutes rather
than between tort and traditional contract limitations. Thus, a
conflict of laws analysis according to both traditional and modem
approaches is necessary to assess the present efficacy of the date-
of-sale limitations and their relevance to the future development
of products liability law.
A. The Traditional Approach to Choice of Law Analysis
Statutes of limitation have historically been viewed as proce-
dural devices which, after passage of a prescribed time period,
prevent a party from seeking legal redress for an otherwise valid
claim.65 Traditionally, statutes of limitation have been applied in
multistate actions according to the conflicts rule of the forum
state, the lexfori, with the following results:
[I]n the absence of a statute to the contrary in most jurisdic-
tions, when the claim is based upon foreign facts, even though
the foreign period of limitation has not run, the plaintiff may
not recover if the time allowed for suit at the forum has ex-
pired. Conversely, if the foreign period has expired, suit may
nevertheless be brought at the forum if the time specified there
has not run.66
Application of the lexfori rule to the conflict between tort and
date-of-sale limitations is likely to result in complete rejection of
the new, stricter date-of-sale statutes. Injured plaintiffs will surely
file suit against manufacturers in states applying tort limitations
whenever the latter are amenable to jurisdiction in such a forum.
They will steer clear of date-of-sale jurisdictions where the limita-
tion period has elapsed, thus barring suit, in favor of tort jurisdic-
tions, where the limitation period does not commence until an
63. See notes 9-15 supra and accompanying text.
64. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 9 supra.
66. G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 146-47 (3d ed. 1963).
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injury has occurred. The increasing amenability of manufacturers
to suit in a variety of jurisdictions as a result of nationwide pro-
duction and distribution, coupled with the fact that only nine
states have enacted date-of-sale limits to date, makes it highly
probable that injured parties will be successful in their attempts to
shop for the forum most favorable to their claims.67
The rigidity of the lexfori rule led the courts to develop sev-
eral exceptions to it. First, if a statutory cause of action, in abro-
gation of the common law, includes its own statute of limitation,
the limit is generally viewed as substantive.68  Second, a statute of
limitation is deemed substantive if it specifically qualifies a sub-
stantive right created by statute.69
Applying these judicially-created exceptions to the current
products liability situation, an argument can be made that the new
date-of-sale limitations are substantive in nature. Although the
law of products liability has generally developed through common
law theories of negligence, warranty, and most recently, strict lia-
bility, a statutory basis for products liability does exist in some
states.70 A number of jurisdictions have enacted statutes which
eliminate privity requirements or follow the standards prescribed
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A.71 Because the
passage of new date-of-sale statutes in those jurisdictions specifi-
cally relates to the right to maintain a products liability suit, it can
be argued that such statutes affect the substantive rights created by
the strict liability statutes.72 In jurisdictions where strict liability
67. Forum-shopping by injured plaintiffs could occur when, for example, the court in
which suit was brought could not obtain jurisdiction over the defendant manufacturer,
possibly because the manufacturer was not "doing business" in the state to the extent nec-
essary to establish the minimum contacts required by International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
68. See, e.g., Gatti Paper Stock Corp. v. Erie R.R., 247 A.D. 45, 286 N.Y.S. 669, a'd,
272 N.Y. 535, 4 N.E.2d 724 (1936) (dismissal of action on the ground that it was not com-
menced within the limitation period provided by the statute creating the cause of action).
69. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 303-07 (1968). See Davis v. Mills, 194
U.S. 451 (1904) (holding that a statute of limitation was substantive since "it was directed
to the newly created liability so specifically as to warrant saying that it qualified the right."
Id. at 454); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886) (holding that when a liability and a rem-
edy are created by the same statute, limitations on the remedy are to be treated as limita-
tions on the right itself).
70. For example, Arkansas, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia have enacted statutes
which provide for strict liability in tort or, at the very least, abandon the privity require-
ment. [1977] 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4110.
71. Id.
72. Under this rationale, the date-of-sale statutes arguably meet the requirement of
specificity discussed in text accompanying note 69 supra.
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in tort originated in judicial decisions73 rather than by statute, this
exception to the exfori rule would not apply. Thus, in only a
limited class of cases-those brought in statutory strict liability ju-
risdictions-can date-of-sale limitations be viewed as substantive
within the exceptions to the traditional lexfori rule in choice of
law analysis.
The ex loci delicti approach to a conflict of laws, whereby the
substantive law of the state in which the cause of action arose is
applied,74 raises difficulties as well. According to this concept, the
substantive character of the cause of action determines when the
limitation period commences. Therefore, in all but the nine date-
of-sale jurisdictions, the lex loci delicti would dictate that the stat-
ute of limitations in products liability actions commence at the
date of injury. If, for example, suif were brought in State A, a
date-of-sale jurisdiction, rather than in State B, a strict tort juris-
diction, the substantive law of State B, strict liability, would apply.
The result would be a contradiction in terms: a date-of-sale limi-
tation period measured from the date of injury.75 Thus, the appli-
cation of traditional methods of choice of law analysis to the
current statute of limitation controversy offers little hope for effec-
tive utilization of the date-of-sale concept in products liability
suits. Until a change in the basic law of products liability occurs,
perhaps through resurrection of a warranty cause of action
76
which is compatible with the date-of-sale concept, it is unlikely
that this new type of statute of limitation will consistently provide
manufacturers with the durational limit they have sought.
B. Modern Approaches to Choice of Law Analysis
The last few decades have seen a great deal of criticism of the
mechanical lexfori and lex loci delicti rules as the proper method
for resolving choice of law questions.77 Historically, statutes of
73. The highest courts of most states have adopted the doctrine of strict liability in tort
[1977] 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4040.
74. See notes 46-48 supra and accompanying text.
75. This result is analogous to that produced by a tort and date-of-sale hybrid statute.
See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
76. See Shanker, supra note 59, at 697, arguing that the Uniform Commercial Code
should govern all product liability actions and that strict liability in tort has brought few
substantive changes while producing much uncertainty and confusion.
77. See, e.g., Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973), in which the
court stated that:
the rule fitted very neatly into basic principles of early conflicts law which rather
arbitrarily compartmentalized the incidents found in a foreign cause of action
into fixed characteristics and mechanical rules in the supposed interests of uni-
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limitation have been viewed as procedural mechanisms that only
restrict, after a given period of time, the forum state's substantive
remedy.78 In contrast, because the choice of which state's substan-
tive cause of action should prevail is determinative of the plain-
tif's rights, it is considered a substantive matter and demands
application of the lex loci delicti rule.79 However, as Professor Le-
flar has aptly pointed out,
A right for which the legal remedy is barred is not much of a
right. It would have made better logic if the limitations rule of
the state whose substantive law is chosen to govern the right
were deemed substantive also, so that both the original and the
terminal existence of the right would be related to the same
body of law. That, however, was not the way the law devel-
oped . . . The result [under the traditional distinctions] is
that plaintiffs whose claims are barred by the governing sub-
stantive law are allowed to shop around for a jurisdiction in
which the statute is longer, in the hope of getting service there
on the obligor.80
Applied to the multistate products suit, Professor Leflar's com-
ments are particularly telling. Application of the historical meth-
odology conceivably permits an injured party to avoid the new
date-of-sale statutes completely. Professor Leflar's proposal, that
statutes of limitation be considered substantive devices, thereby
keyed to the forum state's substantive cause of action, seems to
have the potential to reduce forum shopping in multistate actions.
Suppose, for example, that an injured party brought suit in a
state with a tort statute of limitation in order to avoid a date-of-
sale limitation that would bar the action. If the substantive law of
a date-of-sale jurisdiction governed, that state's date-of-sale limi-
tation would also apply, thus defeating the incentive for forum-
shopping, and, more importantly, the ability to pursue a products
liability claim that has outlasted the limitation period. Therefore,
as long as the cause of action arose in a date-of-sale jurisdiction, a
date-of-sale limitation would be applied, regardless of the plain-
tiffs ability to bring suit in a jurisdiction having a tort statute of
limitation. Characterizing statutes of limitation as substantive
would thus permit consistency in the application of a state's prod-
ucts liability laws and its date-of-sale limitations.
formity and certainty, almost regardless of the justice or good sense of the particu-
lar situation .. "
Md. at 136, 305 A.2d at 415.
78. Note, supra note 9, at 1186.
79. Id. at 1260.
80. R. LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 304.
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Some of the modem choice of law approaches disregard the
traditional substantive-procedural distinction altogether. They
concentrate instead upon the various ingredients of a cause of ac-
tion or upon the interests of the state or parties in a particular suit.
1. The "Contact"Approaches
Within the contacts approach to choice of law, several specific
tests have developed. Under the "center of gravity" or "grouping
of contacts" method initiated by the New York Court of Ap-
peals,"' courts simply tally the various contacts of each jurisdic-
tion With particular events relating to the cause of action-the
place of injury, of sale, and of manufacture. The jurisdiction
where the contacts are most heavily grouped is deemed the center
of gravity and its statute of limitation is applied in the multistate
case.
Using the center of gravity method to choose between a juris-
diction with a tort limitation and one with a date-of-sale statute
leads to a variety of results. First, as long as the number of con-
tacts with a tort jurisdiction is greater than the number of contacts
with a date-of-sale jurisdiction, states having date-of-sale limita-
tions can be avoided.82 Second, it may be impossible to find one
state having truly dominant contacts. Products liability cases are
quite susceptible to this problem because they
present many situations in which the place of manufacture
(harmful conduct) and the place of sale (and resultant injury)
are in different jurisdictions. Both elements being indispensa-
ble and interrelated requirements of liability, the determination
of a center of gravity in most cases would imply an arbitrary
and often tortured process of nationalization.83
Similar criticism can be levelled at the "most significant rela-
tionship" method advocated by the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws.84 This approach examines the quantitative ties of
each state involved in a particular action. It may, however, be
impossible to find a jurisdiction with a quantitatively more signifi-
cant relation to the cause of action than the other jurisdictions
81. See, e.g., Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960); Auten v.
Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
82. The same results would obtain under the "significant relationship" test of conflicts
of law analysis, discussed in text accompanying note 84 infra.
83. Klthne, supra note 52, at 16.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969). The "most signifi-
cant relationship" test has not been advocated explicitly for use in products liability ac-
tions; however, the factors which it considers-the place of injury, place of harmful
conduct, and place of business of the parties-would seem to apply to such actions.
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involved. For example, the place of injury, of manufacture, and
of other contacts may each arise in different states. If so, the
"most significant relationship" approach fails to provide a predict-
able standard by which to determine whether the existing tort lim-
itation or the new date-of-sale limitation should prevail in
multistate products liability cases.
2. The "Interest" Approaches
In contrast to the quantitative approach of the contacts meth-
ods in conflicts of law analysis, the interest approaches are con-
cerned with the qualitative nature of each state's involvement in a
particular cause of action. In the late 1950's, Professor Currie
presented the concept of "government-interest analysis, 85
whereby the interests of the various states in applying their own
substantive laws predominated in the choice of law decision.
Within the framework of government interest, Currie included the
social, economic, or administrative policy expressed by a state in
relationship to the parties, the transaction, the subject matter, and
the litigation. These factors determined the extent of a state's le-
gitimate interest in having its own policy prevail.86
With respect to the decision among statutes of limitation in
multistate products liability cases, the government interest ap-
proach would present courts with difficulties in ascertaining state
policy.87 On one hand, it can be argued that the pervasive social,
judicial, and, in some states, legislative policies, which were af-
firmed by nearly uniform adoption of the strict liability doctrine,8
demand that tort statutes of limitation be applied in all multistate
products liability actions. On the other hand, the recent enact-
ment of date-of-sale limitations by nine states89 may also be
viewed as policy decisions premised upon a "government interest"
in limiting the impact of strict liability on manufacturers, espe-
cially in light of rising insurance costs.90
85. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts A Study in Conflicts of Laws Methods, 25
U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958); Currie, Survival ofActions: Adjudication Versus Automation in
the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958).
86. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 189 (1963).
87. See, e.g., Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973), and note 77
supra.
88. See notes 70 and 73 supra.
89. For specific jurisdictions and the text of their statutes, see note 8 supra.
90. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text. In the case of individualized insur-
ance plans, a cost increase may result from imposition of strict liability. See McCreight,
The Actuarial Impact ofProducts Liabii y Insurance Upon Choice of Law Analysis, 1972
INS. L.J. 335 (1972).
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Given these diverse policy considerations, courts would face
the difficult task of deciding which government interests should
prevail. One possible solution is to view a state's enactment of
date-of-sale limitations as a shift in its products liability policy
which overrides earlier judicial or legislative decisions favoring
the traditional tort statutes of limitation.9 Thus, date-of-sale lim-
itations would apply uniformly in all jurisdictions which had en-
acted them. A second, more moderate solution is to enforce date-
of-sale limitations in cases where the substantive law of states
which have enacted them applies in a multistate suit.9" Under this
arrangement, substantive products liability law would accurately
reflect legislative attempts to redefine that law through enactment
of date-of-sale statutes of limitation. In addition, products liabil-
ity law in jurisdictions with conventional tort statutes of limitation
would remain intact.
Although the government interest approach appears to be gen-
erally useful in effectuating the policies which support date-of-sale
limitations, there may be problems in its application to products
liability actions. As one commentator has noted, even assuming
that the general policies underlying products liability could be as-
certained by a court, the common law development of products
liability has varied so much from state to state that determination
of the relevant government interests would be so difficult that a
court would probably adopt the forum state's policies, with which
it is most familiar.93 This confusion can only be remedied if the
date-of-sale limitations are viewed in the context of the alleged
crisis in products liability. Such a perspective may well lead to the
conclusion that the date-of-sale statutes reflect a legislative policy
decision to override otherwise competing policy considerations
under a traditional government interest analysis.
3. The Princioles of Preference Approach
A conflict of laws approach with an entirely different focus
from the foregoing modes of analysis has been suggested by Pro-
fessor Cavers in his proposal that "principles of preference" be
91. This solution accords with an accepted rule of statutory construction-that when
two statutes conflict, the later in time prevails. See, e.g., United States Steel Co. v. County
of Allegheny, 369 Pa. 423, 86 A.2d 838 (1952); Kimminan v. Common School Dist., 170
Kan. 124, 223 P.2d 689 (1950).
92. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
93. Ktihne, supra note 52, at 17.
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applied in certain multistate situations. 94 The premise of Cavers'
approach is the proposition that:
[I]n a closely-knit federation of states in which a common legal
tradition coexists with innumerable common economic, social,
and political needs, goals, and values, the courts [should] come
increasingly to strive to accommodate the conflicting laws of
the several states in ways that will optimize the working of the
federation.95
In attempting to create an accommodating approach to choice
of law analysis, Cavers sets forth a number of policy preferences.
The first of these applies to a situation in which a conflict of laws
exists between the state in which the injury occurred and the state
in which the defendant's wrongful conduct, defective manufactur-
ing, took place.96 In such a case, if the state where the injury oc-
curred provides for greater compensation for the plaintiff or
imposes a higher standard of care on the defendant, Cavers con-
tends that its law should prevail over that of the state in which the
defendant's action took place.97 Conversely, if the state in which
the defendant acted imposes special controls upon such wrongful
conduct, policies of preference require that the plaintiff be ac-
corded the benefits of the controls though they are not available in
the state in which the injury occurred. 98 Such an approach is
premised upon the assumption that all states recognize the need to
protect their citizens against injurious conduct, and that a prefer-
ence for plaintiffs well serves this universal concern. 99
Applied to the controversy over the proper statute of limitation
in multistate products liability cases, this rationale would uni-
formly reject the new date-of-sale statutes. Tort statutes of limita-
tion, which do not begin to run until the plaintiff sustains an
injury, are clearly more favorable to plaintiffs than are the date-
of-sale statutes which commence when the product is initially
placed on the market. This result, although praised for the uni-
formity it provides, 00 ignores the position of the manufacturers,
and, in light of the soaring costs of products liability insurance, a
choice of laws analysis which protects the consumer without even
94. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 139, 146, 159, 166, 177 (2d ed. 1965).
95. Id. at 119.
96. Id. at 139, 159.
97. Id. at 139.
98. Id. at 159.
99. Id. at 140-41.
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1962).
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addressing the interests of the manufacturer may well be too unre-
sponsive to the latter's complaints:
Professor Cavers envisions another conflict of laws situation,
however, in which date-of-sale statutes could conceivably be ap-
plied under a principles of preference analysis. If the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's injury occur in the same state, and that
state provides less protection of the plaintiff or imposes less strin-
gent controls upon the defendant than does the state in which the
plaintiff resides, the more lenient standards could prevail. 10' This
result, Cavers argues, is as it should be: "the state's plan has been
drawn, not merely for the benefit of the endangered public, but
also with concern for the people whose activities may cause
harm."10 2 Thus, even if the plaintiff resides in a jurisdiction which
espouses a traditional tort statute of limitation and chooses to
bring the cause of action in that state, a date-of-sale statute con-
ceivably could be used. Cavers' approach in this hypothetical, in
which manufacture and injury both occur in one of the nine date-
of-sale states, would protect manufacturers to a limited ex-
tent-but only if it can be assumed that there is a policy prefer-
ence for protecting the defendants from the more stringent
standards imposed by other jurisdictions.
4. The "Better Law" Approach
Professor Leflar has recommended an approach to conflict of
laws which is based on several of what he terms "choice-influenc-
ing considerations."' 13 These are: (1) predictability of results; (2)
maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplifica-
tion of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum state's gov-
ernmental interest; and (5) the better law rule. '4 The first three
considerations provide general guidelines and goals for choice of
law analysis; the fourth, the government interest approach, has al-
ready been discussed. 0 5 The fifth and most widely known of Le-
flar's considerations is the "better law" rule, which recognizes
that, given two rules of law from which to choose, a court deliber-
ately chooses the rule which it regards as intrinsically better. 0 6
101. D. CAVERS, supra note 94, at 146. This hypothetical obviously assumes that the
state in which the plaintiff lives is not the state in which the injury occurs.
102. Id.
103. R. LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 245.
104. Id.
105. See notes 85-93 supra and accompanying text.
106. R. LEFLAR, supra note 69, at 254-55.
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Given the prevailing policies underlying the strict liability in
tort doctrine, the most significant of which is consumer protection,
reliance on the better law approach in the multistate context
would most likely result in adherence to a tort statute of limita-
tion. This would resolve the choice of law issue in favor of the
plaintiff since, as previously discussed, the tort limitation is more
protective of consumers than is the date-of-sale limitation.
The criticisms levelled at Professor Cavers' principles of pref-
erence seem to apply here as well. At the very least, Leflar's ap-
proach entertains a clear bias in favor of the plaintiff, assuming
that the better law as perceived by a court is that which affords
maximum protection to the plaintiff. Further, the burden on the
courts is great and the directive-to identify a "better policy"-is
vague. A more equitable alternative would be to apply a date-of-
sale limitation when the substantive law of a date-of-sale jurisdic-
tion governed the cause of action.'0 7
In conclusion, not one of the traditional or modern approaches
to choice of law analysis ensures consistent application of the new
date-of-sale statutes in multistate products liability cases. The lex
fori rule invites injured plaintiffs to forum-shop to avoid the bar
to suit imposed by date-of-sale limitations.10 8 The contacts ap-
proaches0 9 to the choice of law problem, which attempt to quanti-
fy the connections between events and jurisdictions related to the
cause of action, produce unpredictable results when the "contacts"
are distributed equally. The government interest approach 10 of-
fers hope that the change in underlying policy represented by pas-
sage of date-of-sale limitations will have at least some influence
on a choice of law analysis. However, the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity may still outweigh the concern over the amorphous products
liability insurance crisis, which has been the impetus behind the
passage of date-of-sale limitations.
The plaintiff-oriented approaches espoused by Cavers and Le-
flarII offer little hope for application of date-of-sale limitations.
Under both methods, the defendants' preferences, as a function of
the underlying tort policies of products liability law, play no role
in choice of law determinations. Characterizing statutes of limita-
tion as substantive rules of law may offer the best opportunity for
107. See notes 68-74 and note 80 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
110. See notes 85-93 supra and accompanying text.
I11. See notes 94-102 supra and accompanying text.
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effectuating date-of-sale limitations on a limited basis. If a sub-
stantive approach were adopted, at least those states with date-of-
sale reforms could be assured that their new statutes of limitation
would be used in conjunction with their substantive law in multis-
tate products liability actions. Moreover, such an approach lends
consistency to choice of law analysis. Imposing a definite bound-
ary upon a given defendant's potential liability for its defective
product will undoubtedly help the insurance industry more accu-
rately forecast the costs of litigation and thus provide effective in-
surance coverage.
III. DATE-OF-SALE L-.,ITATIONS: ARE THEY
CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND?
In addition to the serious conflict of laws problems that seem
destined to plague the application of the new date-of-sale statutes
of limitation, a number of constitutional issues also seem likely to
arise. The fact that a plaintiff's products-related claim may be
barred by the running of a date-of-sale limit before an injury even
occurs may have state and federal due process implications." 2
Beyond due process concerns, by entitling a class of tort defend-
ants to special limitations on potential liability, states which have
enacted date-of-sale limitations may well be called to answer alle-
gations that they deny equal protection to some products liability
plaintiffs.
Before evaluating the relative merits of these constitutional
challenges, it is helpful to examine the fate of date-of-sale limita-
tions enacted in the 1960's in an effort to limit the liability of ar-
chitects and builders engaged in improving real estate." 3 Date-
of-sale limitations ranging from three to twenty years were passed
by some thirty jurisdictions. 14 In response, injured parties raised
both due process and equal protection challenges with respect to
these statutes.1t5 In eleven jurisdictions the date-of-sale limita-
112. More specifically, some of the new statutes may establish an irrebuttable presump-
tion that after the limitation period elapses, products are not defective. Such statutes are
subject to challenge under recent Supreme Court cases which have held that such a pre-
sumption, if not "necessarily or universally true in fact," denies due process of law. See
Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534
(1974), and notes 129-41 infra and accompanying text.
113. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-237 (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 2-639 to 2-642
(Burns 1967). See generaly Cotter, Limitation of ,4ction Statutes for Architects and Build-
ers-Blueprintsfor Non-Action, 18 CATH. L. REV. 361 (1969).
114. Massery, supra note I I.
115. See Cotter, supra note 113.
Vol. 30:123
STATUTES OF LIMITATION
tions were upheld; "6 in five states they were found to violate state
and federal equal protection guarantees." 7
With respect to due process claims, these early date-of-sale
limitations were challenged on the basis of state constitutional
guarantees that "every man, for injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law.""' 8 The challengers claimed denial of due process because
the date-of-sale limitations could bar a cause of action before it
ever arose."19 Courts faced with this argument generally looked to
the function of the date-of-sale limitation. Many decisions that
concluded that such a statute redefined plaintiffs' substantive
rights deemed it a permissible exercise of state legislative power.
As such, it did not violate due process. 20
The due process issue with respect to date-of-sale statutes may
well revolve around the extent to which such statutes directly af-
fect a plaintiff's substantive rights or the remedy for violation of
that right. As one commentator has pointed out:
[A]s to those claims . . . accruing before the statutory period
116. E.g., Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1974) (holding that
enactment of a statute of limitation to bar plaintiffs suit before he was injured was within
the power of the state legislature and not a violation of the due process clause of the 14th
amendment or of state constitutional provisions); Josephs v. Bums, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d
203 (1971) (holding that a statute of limitation prohibiting any action for negligent injury
after ten years from the date of injury was intended to set an upper limit on the time within
which an action in tort could be brought and was not unconstitutional regardless of the
date of discovery or the plaintiff's inability to bring an action before the discovery date).
117. E.g., Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (holding that a
statute which regulated the time within which an action must be brought against an archi-
tect or contractor violated a state constitutional provision which prohibited any corpora-
tion, association, or individual from receiving any special or exclusive privilege, immunity,
or franchise); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973) (holding that a statute which
limited the time within which an action for personal injuries caused by a homebuilder's
negligence could be brought improperly destroyed the common law right of action which
existed at the time the statute was enacted); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66
Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975) (holding that a statute limiting the time within which
an action must be brought against those engaged in the construction business was unconsti-
tutional in that it unreasonably afforded special protection to a certain group).
118. IND. CONsT. art. 1, § 12. Every other state has a similar due process guarantee.
119. E.g., Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972) (hold-
ing that under a 10-year statute of limitation for actions against persons improving real
property, a paving contractor who had paved the roadway 34 years before was not liable
for injury sustained by a pedestrian on that same roadway).
120. See, e.g., Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976). The Reeves
court held that a 10-year statute of limitation with respect to actions brought against archi-
tects and builders did not violate a state constitutional provision requiring that each injury
be afforded a speedy remedy. The court found that "the legislature is not constitutionally
prohibited from eliminating common law rights which have not accrued or vested." Id. at
113, 551 P.2d at 652.
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has run, the statutes may act as statutes of limitations, and limit
only the remedy. But as to claims accruing after the statutory
period has run, the enactments are statutes of limitations in
form only, while in essence they are substantive acts defining
rights. 12'
This observation is equally true of the recently enacted date-
of-sale limitations. They impose merely a durational limit when
injury occurs before the limitation period elapses; they exclude the
substantive right to bring suit when injury occurs after the period
elapses. Since the various jurisdictions have the power to define
and redefine their substantive laws, the curtailment by date-of-
sale statutes of the right to maintain a products liability claim
should withstand due process scrutiny.
The equal protection challenges to the architect and builder
date-of-sale limitations were more successful than those waged on
due process grounds. Following the "rational basis" standard of
equal protection, courts inquired whether the classifications drawn
by the date-of-sale statutes bore a rational relation to the legisla-
tive purpose in enacting the statutes.'
22
In some jurisdictions such statutes were deemed underinclu-
sive if there existed a class of persons similarly situated in relation
to real estate improvements but not expressly covered by the clas-
sifications contained in the statute.' 23 Such a class of persons
would be subject to liability for a greater period of time than those
covered by the date-of-sale statutes. 24 In other jurisdictions, the
classification was held to be reasonable in light of the legislative
purpose of limiting liability.' 25 The success of the equal protec-
tion claims seemed to depend in large part on the wording of the
particular statute involved, since it determined the inclusiveness of
its classification. Some statutes limited the liability of only archi-
tects and builders; others limited the liability of any person per-
forming real estate improvements.
26
121. Cotter, supra note 113, at 372.
122. Under the rational basis standard, courts examine the reasonableness of the classi-
fications drawn by such statutes in the context of legislative policies and state interests. See,
e.g., Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970).
123. Contra, Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976) (holding that
a date-of-sale statute of limitation does not violate equal protection principles merely be-
cause a certain class of persons-here, materialmen--could not avail themselves of its ben-
efits).
124. Architects, for example, were sometimes given special immunities not afforded to
owners or persons in control of improvements. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 I11. 2d 455, 458,
231 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1967).
125. E.g., Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
126. Cotter, supra note 113, at 369-74.
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It is improbable that the current date-of-sale limitations will
suffer from the equal protection classification problems that
plagued some of the builder and architect statutes. The various
products liability limitations rely on broad language, referring to
"all product liability type' 27 actions and frequently to "manufac-
turers" and "sellers" as the class whose liability is to be limited.' 28
The classification created by these statutes appears to be congru-
ent with the class of persons whose liability is supposed to be lim-
ited-all potential products liability defendants, including
manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and component manufactur-
ers. Therefore, under state and federal equal protection analysis,
these sufficiently inclusive classifications are likely to be upheld as
having a rational relation to the legislative purpose behind date-
of-sale limitations. Specifically, placing limits on the duration of
the liability of all potential products liability defendants appears
rationally related to the legislative objective of giving relief to all
who must pay crippling products liability insurance costs. Thus,
under the rational basis standard, present date-of-sale statutes of
limitation are likely to withstand an equal protection challenge.
A question remains, however, as to whether the new date-of-
sale limitations can withstand the scrutiny demanded by the
Supreme Court's "irrebuttable presumption doctrine." With its
scope and constitutional underpinnings then as now undefined, 129
the doctrine emerged in a line of cases raising due process and
equal protection questions. 30 At issue in those cases were statutes
which
contained rules denying a benefit or placing a burden on all
individuals possessing a certain characteristic. In the irrebut-
table presumption cases, the Court has treated such a classifica-
tion as being employed only to effect a second classification,
one more directly tied to the true statutory purpose. The char-
acteristic is seen as the "basic fact", from which the "presumed
127. See note 8 supra.
128. Eg., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West Supp. 1978).
129. The doctrine has been subjected to criticism by a number of commentators. See
Simson, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Searchfor a Newer Equal Protection Con-
tinues, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 217 (1975); Note, The New Equal Protection-Substantive Due
Process Resurrected Under a New Name?, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 311 (1975); Note, supra
note 113; Note, The Case of the Pregnant School Teachers: An Equal Protection Analysis, 34
MD. L. REv. 287 (1974); Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due
Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449 (1975).
130. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't
of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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fact"-possession of whatever quality is relevant to the postu-
lated ultimate purpose-is inferred. The Supreme Court cases
have held that if it is not "necessarily or universally true in
fact" that the basic fact implies the presumed fact, then the stat-
ute's irrebuttable presumption denies due process of law.'
31
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine contains threads of
both equal protection and procedural due process. In line with
equal protection analysis, the doctrine focuses on the classification
which a statute creates. Strict scrutiny is then applied to
determine inter alia if some compelling state interest demands that
the statute be enforced. The procedural due process component of
the doctrine requires that the aggrieved party in irrebuttable pre-
sumption cases be given a hearing at which to present evidence
rebutting the presumed fact associated with the classification.'
32
The Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFeur 3 3 illustrates the analysis involved in applying the ir-
rebuttable presumption doctrine. The challenged provision was a
school board rule which required that every pregnant school
teacher take maternity leave beginning five months before the ex-
pected birth of her child.' 34 The classification drawn by the rule
comprised all pregnant teachers; the presumed fact, or conclusive
presumption inferred from the basic fact, was that at the fifth or
sixth month of pregnancy, all of these teachers were physically
unable to continue their duties. The LaFleur Court inquired
whether any compelling state interest required application of the
leave of absence rule to all pregnant teachers, rather than to only
those teachers who had actually become incompetent by reason of
pregnancy. Upon finding that the school board's administrative
needs did not compel such a rule, the aggrieved teachers were af-
forded the opportunity to present evidence of their physical capac-
ity to teach.' 35
Date-of-sale statutes of limitation may be subject to the same
sort of inquiry as that undertaken in LaF/eur. It may be argued
that some of the statutes effectively create irrebuttable presump-
tions that after the specified period has elapsed all products are
nondefective for purposes of maintaining a products liability ac-
131. Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 129,
at 1534.
132. Id. at 1535-36.
133. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
134. id.
135. Id.
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tion. 36 The basic fact upon which the classification in these stat-
utes is drawn is that the duration of liability for all products
injuries should be equally limited; the presumed fact underlying
this classification is that all products are equally nondefective as a
matter of law after passage of the date-of-sale limitation period.
Several date-of-sale statutes, however, expressly reject this ap-
proach by creating rebuttable presumptions, which permit intro-
duction of evidence that a product was indeed defective after
passage of the limitation period. 13 7 These rebuttable presumption
statutes seem to recognize that, with the variety of products on the
market today, each having its own useful life, it is illogical to use a
conclusive presumption based on a single statutory period for all
products.
Assuming that the irrebuttable presumption analysis of La-
Fleur will apply to date-of-sale statutes which contain such pre-
sumptions, it is necessary to determine whether any compelling
state interests require that the statutes be enforced. The interest of
the legislatures in passing these reforms clearly was to reduce
manufacturers' amenability to suit for their injurious products.
Additionally, it may be argued that administrative convenience is
a state interest; setting a single, predictable limitation period for
all products injuries removes the burden on courts to decide what
the length of the limitation period should be for each particular
products injury. On the other hand, because the breadth of the
single date-of-sale limitation period fails to account for such prod-
uct characteristics as latent defects and varying shelf lives, the
state interest in administrative convenience in adjudicating prod-
ucts liability actions may not be compelling. 38 Indeed, the result
of such an analysis may be the same as that of LaFleur: that the
right to present evidence rebutting the conclusive presumption
prevails over notions of administrative convenience.
The preceding analysis suggests that current date-of-sale limi-
tations can withstand constitutional challenges brought on tradi-
tional due process and equal protection grounds. Serious
problems may arise, however, if courts resort to the irrebuttable
136. It appears that the effect of the following date-of-sale limitations may be to con-
clusively presume that all products are nondefective after the passage of the statutory pe-
riod of limitation: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 95.031 (West Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1.5-5 (Bums 1978); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-224(l)-(2) (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (1977); UTAH CODE ANN.
78-15-3 (1977).
137. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 52-577(a) (West Supp. 1978).
138. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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presumption doctrine; given the possibility of latent defects and
variation among useful lives of different products, the presump-
tion that all products are nondefective after passage of the date-of-
sale limitation period may not be "necessarily or universally true
in fact."' 1 The conclusive presumption that a product is nonde-
fective cannot easily be justified by state interests in administra-
tive convenience. Date-of-sale limitations may thus be
invalidated, at least insofar as they deny an aggrieved party the
opportunity to present rebuttal evidence of a product's defective-
ness.
Several ways to avoid the problems posed by the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine are available. In simplest terms, those stat-
utes which create conclusive presumptions can be reformulated to
create rebuttable presumptions to avoid the strict scrutiny re-
quired by the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. Alternatively, a
single limitation period for all products could be discarded in
favor of "useful life statutes of limitation," as recommended by
the Interagency Task Force.14 ° Under a useful life statute, the
length of the limitation period would depend on the normal life
expectancy of the particular product, as established by an amorti-
zation schedule. 141
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to show that there are both choice of
law and constitutional problems posed by products liability date-
of-sale limitations. A sweeping solution to such problems -would
be to discard date-of-sale limitations as inappropriate devices for
achieving the goals sought by the various state legislatures. If
manufacturers and legislatures agree that the underlying policies
of products liability need to be reevaluated and redefined, they
should follow a more direct route: modifying the substantive law
of products liability itself. As one commentator has suggested, the
change in substantive law need not be radical; in fact, the already
existing Uniform Commercial Code, with its warranty statute of
limitation, may provide the durational limit on liability that the
manufacturers are seeking. 142 Nonetheless, reliance on the statute
139. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
140. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-26.
141. Id.
142. Shanker, A Reexamination of Prosser's Products Liability Crossword Game: The
Strict or Stricter Liability of Commercial Code Sales Warranties, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
550 (1979); Shanker, supra note 59. Professor Shanker argues that the U.C.C.'s express
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of limitations, historically a procedural device,143 to effect sub-
stantive change seems ill-advised, particularly in light of the
choice of law problems in multistate cases"' and their constitu-
tional implications.'45
A number of alternatives to the current reliance on statutes of
limitation in products liability law have been suggested. One pro-
posal is to permit recovery in strict liability for a designated pe-
riod of years, after which a products liability plaintiff could only
assert his or her claim in negligence, which in turn demands a
more rigid standard of proof.'4 6 Under this proposal, in negli-
gence actions involving older products, a manufacturer could as-
sert affirmative defenses to its liability. According to its
originator, conversion from strict liability to negligence has the
virtue of simplicity and would avoid the constitutional problems
which can plague special statutes of limitation. 47
In contrast, another theory would create an elective, no-fault
products liability system under which both consumers and manu-
facturers would jointly purchase no-fault insurance.' 48 Thus, the
question of which party is at fault would have no bearing on the
amount of the premium.
Finally, the Department of Commerce has recently unveiled a
Uniform Products Liability Law,149 which utilizes a "useful safe-
life" statutes of limitation.15 0 The useful life of a particular prod-
uct is determined by assessing factors such as its susceptibility to
wear and tear and the replacement and repair practices of its con-
sumers.' 5  Accounting for characteristics peculiar to each product
should forestall the complications raised by the irrebuttable pre-
sumption doctrine5 2 since there will be no presumed fact as to a
product's nondefectiveness after a given point in time.
In summary, the future of the date-of-sale statutes appears un-
warranty and warranty of merchantability impose the same substantive liabilities as does
strict liability in tort and contends that the existing U.C.C. provisions are to be preferred
over the confusing strict tort statutes of limitation. Id.
143. Note, supra note 9, at 1177.
144. See notes 60-111 supra and accompanying text.
145. See notes 112-41 supra and accompanying text.
146. Kircher, Products Liabiliy-The Defense Position, 1977 INS. COUNSEL J. 276,
288-89 (1977).
147. Id. at 288.
148. V. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY (1975).
149. 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979).
150. Id. at 2999.
151. Id.
152. See notes 129-39 supra and accompanying text.
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certain. Even if the statutes can withstand constitutional chal-
lenges, their availability in a multistate products liability suit will
fluctuate with the choice of laws approach adopted in a given situ-
ation. Consequently, although date-of-sale statutes represent a
valid legislative attempt to balance the interests of consumers and
the needs of modem manufacturers, their impact is unpredictable.
To the degree that they fail to provide uniformity in products lia-
bility actions, their effect on products liability insurance rate-mak-
ing must be viewed with skepticism. If there is indeed a crisis with
respect to the soaring costs of products liability insurance, it is
doubtful, based on the foregoing analysis, that the date-of-sale
statutes will be able to alleviate it to any significant degree.
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